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Abstract 
In models of optimal savings with income uncertainty and habit formation, people 
should save early to create a buffer stock, to cushion bad income draws and limit 
the negative internality from habit formation. In experiments in this setting, 
people save too little initially, but learn to save optimally within four repeated 
lifecycles, or 1-2 lifecycles with “social learning.” Using beverage rewards (cola) 
to create visceral temptation, thirsty subjects who consume immediately 
overspend compared to subjects who only drink after time delay. The relative 
overspending of immediate-consumption subjects is consistent with hyperbolic 
discounting and dual-self models. Estimates of the present-bias choices are 
βˆ =0.6-0.7, which are consistent with other studies (albeit over different time 
horizons). 
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I.  Introduction 
 Do people generally save the right amount? High rates of consumer debt and personal 
bankruptcies in the United States, and the drop in consumption upon retirement [Haverman e t 
al., 2006], are consistent with overspending and undersaving [Angeletos et al., 2001]. Choi et al. 
[2005] find that many employees do not save in their pension plan even when it is a dominant 
strategy to do so, and also suggest default options in retirement plans are more responsible for 
savings than preferences are [Choi et al., 2003]. But Scholz et al. [2006] find that savings in 80% 
of households in their sample fit their “optimal” model, and only 20% undersave marginally. 
Lusardi et al. [2004] explain the observed drop in US savings levels can be explained by the 
increases in government savings plans and stock market accumulation, but also cannot explain 
the low savings of a small segment of the population. Other economists argue that retirement 
advisors and traditional savings models have overestimated optimal savings, and when the 
proper benchmark is used most Americans actually oversave compared to that benchmark 
[Darlin, 2007]. 
 As the differences in these studies indicate, it is difficult to conclusively reject or accept 
the basic premise of lifecycle saving, which is that current saving correctly anticipates future 
needs and income variation, and smoothes consumption [Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Venti 
2006]. The difficulty stems from the fact that econometric tests of the lifecycle model typically 
depend on many auxiliary assumptions about utility functions, separability across time, income 
expectations, retirement and other institutional rules, sorting, and credit market constraints. 
Apparent statistical evidence of undersaving in any particular study might be due to one or more 
econometric misspecifications or to mismeasurement of capital gains, educational returns or 
durable consumption flows [Gale et al., 1999].1   
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 While there is no doubt that progress is being made in studies using field data, because of 
the sensitivity of conclusions from field data to possible misspecifications, experiments which 
can create an economic environment matching the assumptions underlying standard theory 
precisely could be of some use.2 Experiments of this type are complements to analyses of field 
data. Control in the lab enables us to evaluate which theories are on the right track and are good 
candidates for analysis in field data; and suggestive observations in field data inspire 
experimental attempts to reproduce those observations in carefully-controlled simple settings.  
 Of course, complementarity of controlled lab data and field data depends on the working 
assumption that lifecycle theories apply in both settings. The subjects in our experiments are 
intelligent college students. They are analytically capable and already have, or will soon be, 
making important savings decisions-- establishing credit, buying durables, and making 
retirement-fund investment allocations. It is not unreasonable to assume their behavior in these 
simple experimental settings will correspond to their later behavior when they begin to save 
more seriously in a few years. 
 Our paper tests three basic theories about savings. The first theory is that consumers save 
optimally relative to the buffer stock savings model. The second theory is that consumers do not 
understand how to save optimally, but can learn to do so from their own experience or the 
experiences of others. The third theory is that consumers cannot save optimally because they 
have a present bias for consumption over savings. We will test these theories with two different 
experimental studies and a pool of highly skilled subjects. 
 In these experiments, subjects make saving and spending decisions in a 30-period 
lifecycle experiment with uncertain income and habit formation. The experimental design 
implements typical assumptions that buffer-stock models make about income and utility. 
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Figuring out how to save optimally is cognitively challenging (it requires solving a two-state-
variable, 30-period dynamic program). Optimal saving requires subjects to save a lot in early 
periods to buffer against bad income shocks and to avoid creating an early consumption 
“internality” that reduces utility from future consumption (because of the habit formation). 
If experimental saving is suboptimal in these relatively simple experiments, then critics 
of the theories as descriptions of actual savings are entitled to be skeptical about whether average 
consumers save optimally in much more complex natural environments. Those who think people 
do save optimally, and any undersaving observed in experiments lacks generalizability, should 
specify what factors explain the difference between experimental and field results. Many of those 
factors could then be included in future experiments. The experiments are also relevant to 
repeated consumption decisions which take place over a shorter time scale than savings, such as 
days or months for highly addictive substances (such as crack cocaine or methamphetamine). 
 The first study explores accuracy of a computationally-difficult buffer stock model, and 
the effect of learning, when rewards are monetary. In the first 30-period lifecycle, most subjects 
save too little, so their lifecycle utility is far from the optimum. However, subjects approximate 
optimization surprisingly well after learning by doing over repeated lifecycles, or after learning 
“socially” from good and bad decisions by other subjects in the first one or two lifecycles.  
 The surprising approximation of optimality observed after a few lifecycles in the first 
study, led us to investigate what conditions would create suboptimal performance. Since the 
design of the first study produces near optimal performance with money, it is useful to keep the 
design across studies. In a second study in which consumption is sips of beverage for thirsty 
subjects (the first time such rewards have been used in economics experiments), we investigated 
whether visceral rewards would produce suboptimal performance. The use of beverage is 
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designed to generate possible self-control problems involving other visceral rewards and 
activities such as food, drugs, exercise, procrastination, and shopping. We designed two 
conditions for this second study, and the literature suggests only one should produce suboptimal 
performance. If behavior is near-optimal, similar to the money study, in both visceral conditions, 
then the tentative conclusion is that near-optimal behavior is robust to whether people are 
earning abstract money or a visceral reward; if the behavior is far from optimal in the two 
beverage conditions uniformly then the conclusion is that the reward medium makes a 
difference, but self-control problems are not present. Only if, we find a difference between the 
two beverage studies, and the immediate condition is farther from optimal can we say 
psychological self-control problems may confound savings decisions.3 
 In the second study’s “immediate” condition, period t decisions lead to immediate 
drinking. In the “delayed” condition, because the amount of beverage subjects decide to consume 
in period t is not delivered until period t+10, any preference for immediacy is muted.  
 Subjects generally consume too much compared to a total-reward-maximizing optimum 
when rewards are immediate, and consume less (although slightly more than that optimum) when 
rewards are delayed. The relative overconsumption in the more tempting immediate condition is 
consistent with models of hyperbolic discounting [i.e., Ainslie, 1975; Laibson, 1997] and dual-
self conflict [e.g., Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue, 2004]. Structural parameter estimates of quasi-hyperbolic β-δ discounting models 
find values comparable to those in other lab and field studies (mean β of 0.6-0.7), albeit over 
different time horizons. 
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II.  Three Theories of Savings Behavior 
 The experimental design implements the assumptions of the buffer stock savings model 
of Carroll, Overland and Weil [2000]. Agents earn income each period, subject to stochastic 
independent shocks from a distribution they know. In each period their available cash is the 
previous buffer stock, plus new income. They divide this available cash between consumption 
and savings. Utility in each period depends upon a ratio of current consumption to a habit index. 
The habit index is a depreciated sum of previous consumption [as in the pioneering design of 
Fehr and Zych, 1998, based on Becker and Murphy, 1988]. An entire 30-period lifecycle is 
repeated several times with different income realizations each time. Through these two 
experiments we are able to test three theories about how people save. These theories are 
described next. 
 
1.  Traditional Economic Theory 
 Traditional economic theory assumes that people act as if they make ex-ante optimal 
savings decisions under uncertainty, discounting future utilities exponentially, given their beliefs 
about future income and other structural parameters. As noted earlier, there is mixed empirical 
evidence as to whether consumers make their savings decisions correctly. In our experimental 
design, subjects should save a lot to build up a buffer stock, then spend roughly their average 
income once their buffer stock is large enough. The buffer stock protects against bad future 
income draws, and limits the negative “internality” of current spending on future utility, which 
occurs because of the controlled effect of habit formation. Figure I illustrates an optimal path of 
consumption, and cash-on-hand, given a particular lifecycle of income shocks (based on 
parameters used in the experiment, described later). Savings is the gap between the black optimal 
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consumption line and the gray cash-on-hand line. In this example, the optimal consumer should 
spend less than current income in early periods except 6-7 (when income happened to be 
unusually low). The optimal cash-on-hand in the example steadily rises to 1500 in period 20, 
building up a buffer stock which is about six times the annual income at that point. That is, 
consumers should brace themselves for a rainy day by saving until about period 20. After period 
20, they should start to dissave by spending more than their current income and dipping into their 
cash-on-hand (i.e., the optimal consumption line is usually above the dotted income line after 
period 20). 
 
2.  Bounded Rationality 
 A second theory is that consumers save suboptimally because their rationality is bounded, 
and solving for optimal saving in the buffer stock model is computationally difficult. Until the 
1990’s, computers were not powerful enough to solve exactly for optimal saving in realistic 
environments. Allen and Carroll [2001] also show that learning by simple reinforcement is far 
too slow to produce convergence to optimal saving in reasonable time scales. It is possible that 
consumers simply cannot figure out or learn over time how to save optimally. Their mistakes 
might be systematic (e.g., undersaving when young) or might be unsystematic, highly-variable 
deviations around the optimal savings path. 
 In previous tests of savings in lifecycle models, experimental subjects typically 
undersave. Kotlikoff et al. [1987] found subjects “overdiscounted” future income in simple 
environments with no income uncertainty. Other studies with variable lifetimes found evidence 
of undersaving [Carbone and Hey, 2004; Carbone 2005]. Fehr and Zych [1998] complicate 
saving by introducing habit formation (as in our study) -- future utilities are lower if previous 
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consumption is higher. Their subjects do not seem to anticipate this “internality” and save too 
little. Ballinger et al. [2003] divide subjects into three cohorts to study social learning. Each 
subject in a cohort completes a savings task sequentially; subjects in each cohort give advice to 
teach their later-cohort successors and observe the advice of their earlier-cohort predecessors. 
Subjects overspent throughout the experiments.  But subjects in the last cohort did significantly 
better than the first two when there was high income variance (but there was no improvement 
with low income variance) so there is no social learning. While undersaving is the typical 
finding, Hey [1988] pointed out that suboptimal savings did not cost subjects that much in his 
study, and the comparative statics predicted by theory in response to parameter changes are also 
correct [Hey and Dardanoni, 1988]. Bernasconi and Kirchkamp [2000] is the only study to show 
oversaving, in a design with uncertainty and overlapping generations. 
 Our first study will also include social learning. Since there is no widely-accepted theory 
of how bounded rationally should be modeled formally in these settings,4 the presence of 
rationality bounds is inferred indirectly: if subjects make mistakes in the first lifecycle, but learn 
over time or from the social examples, then we infer that their initial mistakes resulted from 
bounds on rationality but mistakes are reduced by learning. Development of a theory of 
rationality bounds and learning is a priority for future research. 
 Another kind of bound on rationality is that consumers are overoptimistic about future 
income or underestimate the force of habit formation. Note that these possibilities are ruled out 
by inducing beliefs about the income process and subjects’ understanding of the degree of habit 
formation. So if we find that subjects save optimally, but believe that Americans do not, then the 
experiments suggest that misperceptions about income and habit formation could be the culprit 
in generating suboptimal saving in the field data.  
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3.  Temptation/Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences 
 A third theory is that consumers know how to save optimally, but cannot resist short-term 
temptations to consume for some products. To test this explanation for undersavings we 
converted consumption which is abstract to actual sips of beverage (for thirsty subjects). 
Comparing immediate and delayed delivery of beverage consumption enables us to study 
temptation and dynamic inconsistency. In the immediate condition, consumption decisions in 
one period affect the amount of a beverage the thirsty subjects can drink right away. In the 
delayed condition, consumption decisions affect the amount of beverage delivered 10 periods 
later (about 10 minutes, which feels like a substantial time when you are thirsty). Under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, subjects will drink more beverage in the immediate condition than in the 
delayed condition because the immediacy-preference (or present bias) disappears when rewards 
are delayed (see our working paper for details). Of course, small amounts of beverage are not as 
dramatic as temptations like drug addiction, gambling and credit card spending, but they are 
feasible in the lab and give us a first contrast between money rewards and visceral temptations 
that can guide future research. 
 
III.  Study 1: Learning with money rewards 
1. Experimental design  
 Participants were carefully instructed about the basic concepts of the experiment, and 
how their decisions and the random income draws would determine how much money they earn 
(see our working paper Appendix 1 for details and instructional tables). To avoid demand effects, 
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economic jargon like “income shocks,” “habit stock,” and “utility,” were translated into plainer 
language-- “adjustment factor,” “lifestyle index” and “points,” respectively. 
 Subjects chose tC  in each period from cash-on-hand, which is the sum of previous cash 
plus new income ( )tY . Income in each period is ttt PY η= , the product of tP , permanent income 
that grows at five percent ( tP  =(1.05) 1+tP , with initial 1P =100) and a multiplicative shock tη  
which is lognormally distributed ( ),N(~η 1
2
1log − ). There is no interest rate and discount factor, 
and no borrowing or investment. Period-specific utility depends on consumption and on an 






















kHCu  with risk-aversion 
parameter ρ=3 and a habit strength exponent γ=0.6.5 The habit stock grows according to 
ttt CHH += −1λ , whereλ =0.7 is a depreciation rate [as in Fehr and Zych, 1998] and the initial 
habit 0H =10.  Notice that larger early consumption builds up the habit level and depreciates 
current-period utility, creating an “internality” which implies that optimization requires 
restrained consumption in early periods.  The subject’s problem is to choose the stream of 
consumption SC
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Because T=30 in the experiments, the problem can be simplified to a dynamic programming 
problem with two state variables, cash-on-hand tC  and habit tH (after dividing both variables by 
the permanent income Pt).  
 The experimental environment is designed to have some basic empirical features of 
savings in the modern American economy. The 5% income growth and lognormality of 
multiplicative shocks are shown by Carroll [1992] to characterize US data. However, we chose 
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T=30 to compress the lifecycles (compared to American annualized lifetimes) so we could have 
“lifetimes” which are long enough to create a savings challenge and interesting dynamics, but 
short enough to allow several lifecycles in each experimental session. We also multiplied the 
standard deviation of multiplicative income shocks tη  by five (creating a standard deviation of 1, 
rather than Carroll’s estimate of .2) in order to deliberately produce more income variation.  
 The goal of experiments like these is not to precisely recreate all the empirical properties 
of naturally-occurring decisions in a particular setting. After all, parametric properties of savings 
problems vary widely across periods of history and across countries so there is no single “real 
world” to serve as a unique design target. The goal, instead, is to explore a range of 
environments in which the theory might apply in order to judge when the theory is likely to work 
and when it is likely to fail. We deliberately chose income shock volatility which is larger than 
that observed in the modern American economy because higher income variation creates a more 
analytically-challenging environment. With high income volatility, deviations from rationality 
are more clearly observed; our design also combines uncertain income and habit formation, 
because previous experiments have studied each separately and if learning occurs its power is 
established with more force. 
 The instructions explained all the details of the structure described above. To make the 
details easier to understand, we included 30-draw samples from the lognormal distribution to 
give participants a feel for how much their income could vary and showed the utility functions 
and habit stock evolution using numerical tables (see our working paper). One table illustrated 
how the habit stock in each period was determined by the previous period’s habit stock and the 
current spending. A separate table showed how their spending and habit stock in one period 
determined their utility points in that period. Before participating, subjects took a quiz testing 
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them on how their choices, habit levels, and income shocks would determine utility points. The 
quiz is designed to satisfy concerns that suboptimal consumption decisions do not arise from 
confusion about how their decisions map into points (and eventual money earnings). 
 Consumption decisions were input to an Excel interface which displays the income 
obtained, the corresponding cash available, and the habit stock for each consumption choice (see 
Figure II). The program also calculates and displays the possible points (i.e., utilities) that can be 
obtained from different levels of spending, and the corresponding savings available for the next 
period. Participants can experiment by inputting different consumption amounts and see how 
much utility they will earn, and how much cash they will have available at the start of the next 
period. Most participants tried out several spending choices before making a decision (especially 
in the first couple of lifecycles). This process is repeated until the end of the lifecycle of 30 
periods. (The program automatically spent all cash in the final period 30.) There were a total of 
seven lifecycles, to see how rapidly subjects could learn across lifecycles. Each participant’s 
total payoff was a pre-announced linear function of the total points earned in all lifecycles6 plus a 
$5 showup fee. Subjects earned between $7.50 to $65 with an average of $45. 
 Thirty-six (36) subjects participated in the private learning condition described above. 
Thirty-six (36) more participated in a “social learning” condition. In the social learning 
condition, as part of their initial instructions they were also given samples of what three actual 
subjects had done in the private learning condition.7 The three samples were taken from the 
highest-earning subject, the lowest-earning subject, and from one subject chosen at random from 
the private condition in their subject pool. The social learning subjects were told how these three 
samples were chosen.  
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 There are many ways to implement social learning or imitation [e.g., Ballinger et al., 
2003, use direct talking]. Our method mimics intergenerational imitation in which a parent points 
out three role models-- a great success who retires wealthy, a ne’er-do-well who ends up broke, 
and a random acquaintance. Keep in mind that the high-earning role model they are presented 
with might be a subject who overspent early on (relative to the optimum) but got lucky by 
receiving high income draws. If subjects copy the “successful” subject too directly they could 
easily overspend relative to the optimum; so it is not clear whether social learning will actually 
help, hurt, or have no effect.  
 Participants were 35 undergraduates from the National University of Singapore (NUS) 
and 37 undergraduates from California Institute of Technology. These students are unusually 
adept at analytical thinking so they should represent an upper bound on how well average 
consumers do in these intertemporal optimization problems. The participants were recruited 
using the universities’ mail servers. Half the participants (18 from each school) did the 
experiment with private learning and approximately half (17 NUS, 19 Caltech) did the 
experiment with social learning. Each group had seven lifecycles of 30 periods of income draws. 
To simplify data analysis, within each condition all participants had the same income draws (but 
the draws were different in the two learning conditions).8 Most participants completed the 
instruction and seven lifecycles in about 90 minutes.  
 
2. Basic results 
 Table I gives summary statistics of actual point outcomes in the two learning conditions. 
The first and second rows give the average of total lifecycle points in each condition, and the 
standard deviation across subjects. The third row is the difference between the average point 
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total and the (unconditional) optimal point total.9 The fifth row is the total income in each 
lifecycle (which gives an idea of whether deviations from optimality in a particularly lifecycle 
are due to bad decisions or to bad income luck). 
 With only private learning, performance in the first three lifecycles is well below the 
unconditional optimum and highly variable across subjects. However, by lifecycle four the 
average subject earns point totals within 80% of the optimum and the variability across subjects 
shrinks.  
 Table I (bottom panel) also shows that social learning brings point outcomes close to the 
optimum rapidly. The mean and variation of points in the very first lifecycle with social learning 
are similar to those statistics from lifecycles 4-7 with only private learning.10  
 
3. Behavior relative to conditional optimization 
 The Table I statistics compare point totals to unconditional optimal level of spending in 
each period. This can be a misleading comparison because conditional optimal spending in each 
period depends on the participant’s actual cash-on-hand and accumulated habit stock. A subject 
who makes some bad decisions in early periods, but then wises up and makes conditionally 
optimal decisions in later periods, will look bad in Table I but may be close to conditionally 
optimal overall when a few early mistakes are averaged with smart later decisions.  
 Each subject’s average conditional deviation for each period is the difference between 
their actual spending and the optimum (conditioned on that participant’s earlier decisions). 
Figure III plots the conditional deviation paths for lifecycles 1 and 7 with private learning, along 
with 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines). Since the optimal conditional path in Figure III is 
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the horizontal axis, the reader can judge at a glance whether deviations are significant by seeing 
whether the confidence interval covers the zero line or is far from it.  
 Figure III confirms the conclusion from Table I: With only private learning, participants 
in lifecycle 1 are spending significantly more than optimal in early periods, until about period 20 
(when they often spend too little). However, the lifecycle 7 conditional deviations are never 
significantly different from zero, which shows that learning is very effective over the seven 
lifecycles. In fact, the actual spending path is insignificantly different from the conditional 
optima by lifecycle 4. 
 Figure IV shows the analogous data for the social learning condition. These small 
deviations are deliberately plotted with the same y-axis scale as in Figure III, to show how much 
smaller the deviations are when there is social learning compared to private learning. Deviations 
are insignificantly different from zero in most periods. There is also little difference between 
lifecycles 1 and 7 in the social learning condition, because the initial performance is so close to 
optimal.  
 To measure the effects of private and social learning, we regressed the log of the absolute 
deviation from the conditional optimum on dummy variables for lifecycles (excluding the first 
lifecycle), the period number and its square, and dummy variables for social learning condition, 
gender (Female=1, mean=.43) and ethnicity (Chinese=1, mean=.50).11 
 Table II shows the results. The period effect is positive (but nonlinear because the period2 
effect is negative) because the absolute deviations are larger in later periods, when incomes are 
larger. The social learning main effect is highly significant (it implies a 24% reduction in 
conditional deviation), as are the dummy variables for some of the later lifecycles, reflecting 
overall learning from multiple lifecycles (5 and 7). There is no significant effect of ethnicity and 
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a small effect of gender (women deviate about 20% more).  
 
IV.  Study 2: Beverage rewards and temptation 
1. Experimental design 
 Study 2 was almost the same as the first study with one large change.12 Lifecycles 1-2 
and 4-5 (with money rewards) were the same as in study 1. However, in lifecycle 3 subjects 
received a fixed monetary payment for their participation but did not earn any additional money 
for decisions. Instead, in each period they drank an amount of a beverage13 proportional to their 
consumption decisions each period (1 ml beverage for each 2 points). The Excel interface was 
modified to show the total milliliters of beverage reward to be obtained, rather than points 
(utilities). It also displayed the maximum milliliters of beverage reward that could be obtained 
through spending all available cash immediately. As noted in the introduction, this change was 
designed to see if savings decisions about abstract money reward are different than viscerally-
tempting rewards-- namely, liquid consumption of thirsty subjects.  
 To make this reward appealing and limit satiation across the experiment, subjects were 
asked not to drink for four hours before the experiment began.14 They also begin by eating some 
salty snacks. Since it takes them 45 minutes to read the instructions and do two 30-period 
lifecycles for money before the beverage lifecycle, they are definitely thirsty by the time they 
reach the beverage lifecycle. It is likely that they do not satiate during the lifecycle because no 
subject received more than 350 ml of soda (less than a 12 oz. can of Coca-cola) in that lifecycle, 
and subjects could only drink a maximum of 20 ml/period (0.7 oz), and beverage periods were 
separated by one minute.15 Subjects were required to drink their entire beverage consumption in 
that one minute period. 
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 A syringe pump with three syringes was used to deliver an exact amount of beverage into 
a cup.16 If subjects incurred a negative number of points in any period, they incurred a debt of 
sorts-- they would not receive any beverage until that level had been offset by future positive 
point totals. This debt is “forgiven” at the end of the beverage lifecycle because we cannot force 
subjects to “pay back” the debt for future drinking (as we do in the money lifecycles). 
 There were also two different reward-delivery conditions in the beverage lifecycle. In the 
immediate condition subjects received their beverage reward right after making their decision. In 
the delayed condition subjects received their beverage reward chosen in period t ten periods after 
making their decision, in period t+10.17 Quasi-hyperbolic or present-bias models of time 
discounting predict that subjects will drink more beverage in the early periods of the immediate 
condition because delayed rewards are heavily discounted (see our working paper). In the 
delayed condition, immediate choices do not lead to immediate consumption so the present bias 
term in discounting disappears. As a result, subjects should drink more overall in the delayed 
condition.  
 Subjects were n=52 Caltech students.18 Because a single liquid-delivery apparatus was 
used, experiments were conducted in a single office rather than a computer lab with one subject 
at a time. As a result, this study was more laborious than many economics experiments (taking 
about 130 hours of experimenter-subject contact time).  
  
2. Results  
2.1 Total beverage awarded 
 The hyperbolic discounting and dual-self models predict that subjects in the immediate 
condition would receive less beverage than in the delayed condition, because they will consume 
 17
relatively more compared to a total-reward-maximizing optimum in early periods. This 
prediction is empirically correct (see Table III, row 1). The immediate-condition subjects drank 
less total beverage on average (179 ml, std. dev.=84.6) than the delayed-condition subjects (226 
ml, std. dev.=79.0). Though there is substantial variation across subjects, this difference is 
significant at conventional levels by one-tailed tests (t-test p=0.047, Mann-Whitney rank sum 
test p=0.015).  
 
2.2 Adjusting for skill 
 Simply comparing total beverages in the immediate and delayed conditions does not 
control for possible differences in skill or discounting between subjects in those conditions that 
could be evidenced by differential performance in the four money lifecycles. To control for these 
skill differences, we estimate the regression 
(1) itit eIbrbrbrbrbaP ++++++= 554432211 . 
where itP  is the point total for subject i in lifecycle t, ri is a dummy variable for lifetime i, and I is 
a dummy variable for the immediate condition. If immediate consumption triggers 
overconsumption and poor savings accumulation, b5<0. 
 Notice that point totals can be negative for the beverage lifecycle, but the total ml of 
beverage consumed cannot be negative. (Subjects cannot be forced to “pay back” liquid once it is 
consumed.) This constraint is different than for the money rounds because a monetary point debt 
accumulated in one lifecycle can be offset by other lifecycles. Subjects are aware of this 
difference in incentive structures. If a large beverage deficit (>350 ml) occurs in an earlier 
period, they know that no amount of spending can erase the deficit. As a result, when subjects 
have large negative point totals they can become indifferent about future decisions (their 
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marginal incentive disappears) and produce high negative points. These high deviations occurred 
disproportionately in the immediate condition, which then greatly overstates 5b  when the 
dependent variable is points (see Table IV).19 In order to reduce the effects of these outliers, two 
alternative regressions were run. In one specification, each lifetime money point total was 
calculated as if it were a beverage lifecycle (i.e., periods with negative utility are ignored). In the 
third specification, extreme point totals were reduced in magnitude by taking the logarithms of 
their absolute values with their sign preserved (i.e., the dependent variable is [|Pit|/Pit]ln(|Pit|). 
 Table IV shows the results of a random effects regression run on each model. In all three 
specifications the sign of 5b , the effect of the immediate condition, is negative and significant at 
p<0.05. The fact that these results are stronger in significance than the parametric t-tests reported 
in Table III, suggests that accounting for individual differences in skill by using the money-
lifecycle results actually enhances the significance of the immediate-delayed condition difference 
by reducing variation from cross-subject differences. 
 These analyses use the overall point totals in the lifecycle. As in study 1, it is also useful 
to examine conditional deviations in each period given decisions in previous periods. For each 
period in the beverage lifecycle we calculated the future expected points for that subject resulting 
from her decision, compared to the future expected points from a conditionally total-reward-
maximizing optimal decision in that period. We then converted these amounts to ml of beverage 
and totaled these values over all thirty periods. Since no subject could receive more than 350 ml 
of beverage in the lifecycle or less than 0 ml, we bounded all totals at 350 ml. Row 2 of Table III 
shows the results. The average total expected beverage loss, in conditional deviation from 
optimality, is much higher for the immediate condition than for the delayed condition (about 
twice as high). 
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2.3 Exploring the time series of overspending in early periods 
 Figure V shows the average ratios of spending to conditionally optimal spending. (In the 
first 10 periods the optimal line is now just a flat line at a ratio of 1.) Figure V confirms that even 
when conditioning on past decisions, the immediate-condition subjects are spending more in the 
first five periods. (After that period the higher number of subjects with beverage deficits and 
large habits in the immediate condition pushes down their overspending.)20 Another diagnostic 
statistic is the average overspending in those periods in which subjects overspend compared to 
the conditional optimum. The immediate group subjects actually made somewhat fewer 
overspending decisions than the delayed-condition subjects (41% vs. 51% of decisions),21 but 
when they did overspend, the immediate condition subjects spent much more than was optimal 
(Table III, row 3), which is the key source of greater expected losses.  
 
2.4 Estimating quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters 
The results presented to this point have supported the basic prediction of the hyperbolic 
discounting and dual self models, that subjects in the immediate condition consume less overall. 
Because the hyperbolic model is clearly parameterized, we can also estimate best-fitting values 
of the parameters δ~ and β~  from savings decisions and compare those values to estimates from 
other studies. The analysis is restricted to observations when subjects did not encounter beverage 
deficits. When a subject encountered a beverage deficit, their decision could only be made to 
receive future rewards and so β~ , the immediate bias term, should not apply.22  
 In the quasi-hyperbolic model, the weights placed on immediate and future rewards are 1, 
βδ, βδ2, … βδt ... If δ is close to one the terms δt are close in numerical value, so there will be 
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many combinations of (β,δ) values which produce similar sequences of weights and similar 
choices. It is therefore difficult to estimate the two parameters separately by searching for a pair 
of best-fitting values from choices; there are many pairs with low β and high δ values that will fit 
about equally well, and when this procedure was used it often yields values of β that are close to 
0 or above 1. We therefore use a two-stage procedure to calibrate δ and β for each subject.  
 Since behavior in the delayed condition gives no information about the present bias β, in 
theory, the delayed-condition data will be used to estimate δ. So we first search for best-fitting 
values of δD which explain delayed-condition subject choices as if they are maximizing 
discounted expected utility of consumption with a discount rate δD and β=1. These estimates 
minimize the sum of squared percentage deviations between the actual consumption and the 
consumption predicted by the model. This estimation gives a distribution of δD estimates with a 
mean of .904 and standard deviation, across subjects, of .230. This mean value is significantly 
less than one at the 2% level by a cross-subject t-test (see Table V). 
 The next challenge is to estimate βI values in the immediate condition, using reasonable 
values of δ.23 The procedure we use first fixes β=1 for each immediate-condition subject and then 
estimates a best-fitting value of δI for each of those subjects. These values are shown in Table 
VI; the mean δI is 0.85 and the standard deviation is 0.24. Since we are fixing β=1, but we 
believe the actual βI values might be below 1, we need to adjust the δI values in some way that 
permits more precise estimation of β. We do this by projecting the subject-specific values of δI 
onto the value of the distribution of δD estimated from the delayed-condition subjects which has 
the same standardized deviation. That is, a specific immediate-condition estimate δI is adjusted to 
an estimate δI* where (δI*-0.904)/0.23=(δ - 0.85)/0.24. This procedure permits individual 
differences in δI values, but yokes their distribution to the distribution of δD values to permit 
 21
better identification of β. Using these adjusted values of δI* for each immediate-condition 
subject, we estimate βI for each subject.  
 There is one further complication. In quasi-hyperbolic models, people can be either 
sophisticated or naïve [e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999]. Sophisticated subjects discount 
delayed payoffs steeply but understand that in the future they will discount steeply too. Naïve 
subjects discount steeply but believe, mistakenly, that their current discount factors applied to 
future periods will also be applied to later decisions. The difference between sophistication and 
naïveté can be illustrated in a three period example. In the first period, both types of subjects 
apply weights 1, βδ and βδ2 to the three periods. However, the sophisticated subject knows that 
the discount rates 1 and βδ will actually be applied to periods 2 and 3 when period 2 decisions 
are made, and accounts for this weighting in forecasting period 2 and 3 choices. The naïve 
subject thinks the discount rates βδ and βδ2 will be used in period 2 to weight period 2 and period 
3 utilities; since the βδ term will divide out in optimization, the naïve subject therefore thinks the 
relative weights applied in periods 2 and 3 will be 1 and δ (i.e., the naïve subject thinks he will 
act like an exponential discounter in the future). In simple choice experiments these two 
behavioral assumptions are difficult to distinguish empirically, but our 30-period experiment 
gives some empirical leverage for distinguishing them. We therefore estimate β values (using the 
adjustment procedure described above) assuming both sophisticated and naïve forecasting of 
future behavior (see our working paper). 
 The results are summarized in Table V. The estimates of β in both the sophisticated and 
naïve models are clustered around 0.6-0.7. Table VI shows individual results;24 all but one 
subject’s estimate is below 1 for both specifications, so the hypothesis that there is no present 
bias (β=1) is strongly rejected.25 The estimates of β~  are in the ballpark of estimates of 
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Angeletos et al. [2001] (β~ =0.55), Della Vigna and Paserman [2005] (β~ =0.9), and Tanaka, 
Camerer and Nguyen [2006] (β~ =0.74-0.89) (from macroeconomic calibration, unemployment 
spells, and experiments in Vietnam, respectively). Measured by the sum of squared deviations, 
the naïve model fits better in 16 of 26 subjects. Since this structure is not deliberately designed to 
distinguish the two specifications, this is just a clue that both specifications should be taken 
seriously as explanations of behavior respectively.  
 
2.5 Myopic loss-aversion 
 A widely used concept in behavioral economics which might apply here is “myopic loss-
aversion.” Loss-aversion is the idea that people are disproportionately averse to making 
decisions that create nominal losses relative to a point of reference [see Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; e.g., Camerer, 2005, Camerer, forthcoming, Goldstein et al., 2006]. Myopic loss-aversion 
means that people focus on losses only in a small segment of time or a part of a portfolio, 
neglecting the benefits of decision rules which aggregate losses and gains across choice sets. In 
our setting, one hypothesis from myopic loss-aversion is that subjects will be unusually reluctant 
to choose a consumption level that generates a period-specific utility which is negative 
(assuming zero is a reference point).26 Figure VI tests this hypothesis using study 1 data, by 
plotting nominal utility losses in each period from actual consumption on the y-axis, and 
corresponding losses that would have resulted from conditionally-optimal consumption (for 
utilities between -50 and +50, n=14,228). There is a sharp visible drop-off in points between the 
bottom and top halves of the Figure VI scatter plot. It appears that subjects hate to lose a small 
amount of nominal utility, even when they should take a small loss to build up savings. [as 
shown in Fehr and Zych, forthcoming]27 A piecewise-linear jackknife regression through the 
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origin gives coefficients in the domain of positive and negative conditionally optimal utilities of 
0.79 and 0.15, respectively. The ratio of these two slopes is 5.2. Another way to see the effect is 
to plot histograms of small actual and optimal utilities (between -10 and +10), across all subjects 
and periods (see Figure VII). In the actual period-by-period utilities there is a huge spike on the 
slight positive side. This spike is not at all evident in the corresponding distribution of optimal 
utilities, so the preference for a small positive utility and aversion to loss is not normative.  
Figures VIII-IX show actual-optimal utility scatter plots like Figure VI, for the money 
periods and beverage periods of study 2. For money (Figure VIII), the jackknife regression gives 
positive and negative slopes of 0.88 and 0.10 (a ratio of 8.8). For beverage (Figure IX), the 
slopes are 0.92 and 0.62 (a ratio of 1.49). The difference between money and beverage is 
consistent with the idea that in the domain of beverage, subjects know that a large loss creates a 
debt that they must pay off before getting more sips, so they are more willing to accept small 
losses rather than run up large debts. Johnson et al. [2006] also show variations in loss-aversion 
across domains.  
The myopia underlying Figures VI-IX is surprising. The subjects make 210 separate 
money decisions in study 1, and 120 decisions in study 2. They know that the utilities in each of 
those periods will be added up at the end to determine their total money earnings. (The software 
even updates the total points for each lifecycle every period and shows the total at the bottom of 
the screen.) There is no good normative reason to avoid a small loss in any single period (as 
Figure VII showed). These data are a reminder that a complete theory of theory of loss-aversion 
and its interaction with a myopic focus needs to account for how broadly decisions are bracketed 
or lumped together [Thaler, 1999; Read et al., 1999].  
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V. Conclusions 
 Evidence on savings suggests people are not always saving optimally. However, tests 
with field data depend sensitively on assumptions about expectations, separability of 
consumption, and other unobservables. Experiments control for these assumptions, and generally 
show that experimental subjects save too little. 
 This paper seeks to establish some boundary conditions under which intelligent subjects 
at the start of their economic lifecycles make decisions in a complex savings problem which vary 
from nearly-optimal to highly suboptimal. The experiment environment is difficult because there 
is income uncertainty and habit formation (i.e., consumption utility depends on previous 
consumption). We find that subjects save much too little at first, but learn to save close to 
optimal amounts after three or four lifecycles of experience. Furthermore, subjects who have 
received social learning, examples of successful, unsuccessful, and average experimental 
performance, produce savings decisions that are quite close to optimal even in their first 
lifecycle. Since consumers are limited to one lifetime of private learning, it would be interesting 
to know what types of social learning are more effective. Does social learning work better when 
it comes from family and friends, from total strangers, from financial planners, or from training 
and education? 
 The fact that subjects can learn to save optimally for money rewards led us to explore 
whether they save optimally when rewards are more immediate and visceral -- when thirsty 
subjects’ rewards are immediate sips of a cola beverage. The subjects who sip the beverage 
immediately also overspend, compared to group of subjects who make decisions in one period 
but do not get to sip that period’s beverage amount until ten periods later. As a result of their 
overspending, subjects in the immediate-reward condition earn less total rewards than those in 
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the delayed condition, and get less than the theoretical, total-reward-maximizing optimum. This 
unique feature of our second study provides a model for future studies of highly tempting 
decisions like addiction, overeating, and perhaps spending splurges.  
 The difference in the performance of the immediate and delayed conditions is consistent 
with the predictions of both the quasi-hyperbolic and dual self models, and is not consistent with 
the standard exponential model. When parameters of the quasi-hyperbolic model are calibrated 
from subject decisions in the immediate condition, the mean best-fitting β~  (the degree of 
present bias) is 0.62 for the sophisticated case and 0.72 for the naïve case. These values are close 
to values observed in some other studies using both calibrations to aggregate data and direct 
experimental measurement. There is also strong evidence of myopic loss aversion in our 
experiment. Subjects in all treatments strongly prefer to make savings choices which result in 
small positive utility gains, when optimal decisions would lead to small negative utilities.  
 There are many directions for future research. The experimental paradigm could also be 
extended by adding more lifelike features, such as stochastic mortality, retirement, and supply-
side advice which either tempts subjects more or gives them good advice. The fact that subjects 
in the delayed condition are able to resist temptation better (and drink more total beverage as a 
result) corroborates the conclusion of models like Bernheim and Rangel’s [2004], that creating a 
time wedge between “ordering” and consuming may be helpful to people. This observation 
suggests an experimental way to measure demand for external self-control. The immediate-
condition subjects are making a mistake, but they can’t help doing so. If they had access to 
external commitment, sophisticated hyperbolics would seek external commitment. Future 
experiments could allow subjects in beverage studies the choice between whether they want to 
participate in the immediate or delayed condition; sophisticated subjects should opt for the 
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imposed delay. Naïve hyperbolics and exponential discounters would be indifferent about both 
conditions. An alternative theory [Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001] suggests that agents might prefer 
the delayed condition if it reduces disutility from temptation. 
 The natural question about experiments of this type is how well their results generalize to 
naturally-occurring savings by different groups of people. While economic agents cannot 
experience more than one lifecycle, they can learn from the savings success and mistakes of 
others. Retirement advisors may exist because individuals are unable to make retirement 
decisions in one lifecycle but can make good decisions after observing multiple lifetimes (and 
those histories are bottled and sold by advisors) and with formal tools to analyze and explain 
what to do. The market may have solved the cognitive problem in savings models by producing a 
supply of helpful retirement advisors. These phenomena can be studied in experiments too, by 
allowing markets for advice and group-level decisions (e.g. household saving) to see whether 
these institutions contribute to optimal choice. 
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1 For example, using the economic surprise of German reunification, Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln [2005] find 
that evidence of buffer-stock savings is sensitive to self-selection of risk-averse workers into low-risk professions. 
2 Consumers could undersave in field settings relative to theories based on rational expectations, because they are 
overconfident about their income, or pessimistic about their longevity. Our experimental setting controls for those 
beliefs, which are difficult (though not impossible) to observe in field data, because income distributions and 
longevity are known to subjects. 
3 In the case of the first two conclusions, it is useful to combine data across studies. It is not useful to combine data 
to make the third. 
4 Ballinger et al. [2005] model bounded rationality as individuals only looking ahead a fixed number of periods. 
They interpret the results of Ballinger et al. [2003] to suggest most subjects only look ahead two periods. 
5 Since ρ=3, the term k  is the upper asymptote of utility. θ  is a scaling parameter, and εˆ  bounds the utility 
function from below. In the experiments, εˆ  = 2.7, similar to Ballinger et al. [2003]. Scaling factors are θ = 750 and 
k=40. 
6 The exchange rates were US $1.50 for every 100 experimental points in Caltech, and US $2.50 in Singapore (using 
an exchange rate of US $1 ≈ Sing $1.70). 
7 The tables looked like the screens the participants had, showing income each period, cash-on-hand, spending 
decisions, and points from each period of a 30-period lifecycle. 
8 The income realizations were different so that the social learning subjects would never have a lifecycle that 
matched exactly the income realizations seen by the role model subjects (drawn from the private learning condition). 
9 Note that in some cases, the average subject does better than the unconditional or conditional optimum (i.e., the 
deviation from optimality is positive). This can happen if participants overspend (underspend) but get lucky 
(unlucky) and have good (bad) income shocks in later periods. 
10 It should be noted that in both conditions lifetime 5 featured the lowest total income (the harshest income draws). 
In condition 1 it managed to cause the subjects and the ex-ante optimal path to have negative utility. In condition 2 it 
only reduced the utility of the subjects. 
11 See Chua and Camerer [2004] for details. Ethnicity is of interest because Singaporean Chinese have one of the 
highest savings rates in the world; [cf. Carroll, Rhee and Rhee, 1999]. Participant random effects were also included 
to control for individual differences, which are substantial. In a broader specification a Caltech dummy variable was 
also included but is insignificant and is dropped. The Chinese dummy variable is correlated with subject pool, but 
not strongly. There are many ethnic Chinese students at Caltech, and Singaporean students are not exclusively 
Chinese. 
12 One reason to keep the complex design with habit formation and stochastic income was because behavioral 
research suggests that higher cognitive loads make people more likely to succumb to visceral temptation [Shiv and 
Fedorikhin, 2002]. Additionally subjects are more likely to succumb to temptation if they are unaware they are 
doing so [Baumeister et al, 1994] or if the signals of doing so are noisy [Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Benabou and 
Tirole, 2004]. 
13 Subjects were given their preference of Coke or Pepsi, and could substitute Diet Coke or Diet Pepsi if they 
requested it. We used these beverages because they are widely valued, water was as motivating as colas, and 
because pilot subjects (including the middle coauthor) thought fruit juices that were tried were too filling and might 
induce satiation which complicates the analysis. 
14 There is no way to know whether all subjects obeyed our request to show up thirsty. However, because 
assignment to the immediate and delayed conditions did not depend upon apparent thirst, uncontrolled and 
unmeasured differences in pre-experiment thirst are sources of sampling error in comparing the two groups which 
lower the power of the test and bias the test against finding a difference between the immediate and delayed 
conditions. 
15 The concavity of utility and properties of the buffer stock savings model ensure that no subject could earn more 
than 700 points in any beverage or monetary lifecycle. 
16 See our working paper for a diagram of the beverage delivery apparatus. 
17 To standardize both conditions completely there were forty periods of one minute each in lifecycle 3. In the 
immediate condition, subjects did nothing in the last ten periods. In the delayed condition, subjects made decisions 
in the first ten periods of the delayed condition but received no rewards. In the last ten periods of that condition 
subjects received their rewards from periods 21-30 but made no decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                              
18 The first 44 subjects were run from April 21 to July 27, 2005. After that, 11 more subjects were run from February 
7-16, 2006 to enlarge the sample and check robustness of the result. Two subjects refused to drink during the 
beverage period and were dropped from the analysis. Another subject’s data were lost by mistake. 
19 Since subjects know they will not be forced to pay back previously-consumed beverage, it is conceivable that they 
exploit this design property by deliberately overconsuming in early periods and then running up point debts they do 
not have to pay. We do not estimate such a model because the period-specific maximum of liquid consumption is 20 
ml per period, so the marginal beverage value of increased consumption falls sharply. As a result, subjects who are 
trying to optimize total liquid would smooth consumption and would never deliberately run up a debt. In terms of 
our estimation below, a deliberate strategy of overconsuming because of anticipated “bankruptcy” will be 
misclassified as a low value of the discounting parameter δ. There is no a priori reason to think this pattern will be 
more common in the immediate and delayed conditions if both types of subjects have similar discounting patterns. 
20 Immediate subjects have more beverage deficits (4 subjects vs. 1 in period 6; 15 vs. 8 by period 10) and higher 
average habit levels accumulated (218 v. 185 in period 6) than the delayed condition. It is not the case that the 
immediate subjects have satiated on soft drinks compared to the delayed group, because the immediate subjects have 
only drank about 57 ml (2 oz) on average after five periods. 
21 Periods in which a subject encountered a deficit of 20 ml or greater were omitted in this analysis. 
22 Additionally, subjects with high enough beverage deficits knew they would not receive liquid again and have no 
incentive to choose one spending decision over another. While some subjects never encountered a beverage deficit, 
and others encountered them early, each subject was given a single parameter value and the results were analyzed so 
that each subject’s value counts as much as any other. 
23 Using the mean of the delayed-condition estimates δD and estimating subject-specific βI works poorly because 
differences in δ values for those subjects from the mean δD leads to implausible variation in estimates of βI. The 
problem with using the delayed-condition mean δD for the immediate-condition subjects is the following: suppose an 
immediate-condition subject’s δ is smaller than the mean δD. Then the best-fitting sequence of weights 1, βδ, βδ2, … 
βδt will overestimate β because the β parameter is forced to pick up the slack for the under-estimated δ. Similarly, if 
the immediate-condition δ is below the mean δD, β will be underestimated. Indeed, when we tried this procedure the 
estimate of β tends to bifurcate to the lower and upper bounds placed on β. 
24 A possible, self-revealed, equivalent of individual β values are subject values on the Barratt Impulsivity Scale. 
After subjects had completed their experimental session, they answered a survey measuring their total “impulsivity” 
on the BIS 11 Barratt Impulsivity scale [Patton et al., 1995]. However, these values show little correlation with the 
individual naïve betas, sophisticated betas, nor subject performance (-0.1<correlation<0.1). 
25 The correlation of β and δ estimates across subjects is around .35 for both specifications of β, so there is no 
serious identification problem. 
26 Subjects sometimes input a series of consumption levels, trying to find the value that would give a positive utility. 
Unfortunately, the software did not capture these attempts; data like these would be useful to understand the nature 
of loss-aversion and its persistence. 
27 The result is reminiscent of DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser’s [1999] finding that small negative earnings 
announcements, and small year-to-year drops, are relatively rare for corporations. 
 Table I: Summary statistics of actual point outcomes 
 
Lifecycle  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Private Learning 
Mean Points 
( )∑ = −Tt tt HCu1 1,  
(average over subjects) 
118 -53 224 450 -65 435 440
Std. dev. Points 635 694 498 297 475 255 146




















(average over subjects) 
-453 -628 -349 -125 11 -153 -149
Total Income 
∑ =T st tX  5471 7083 5215 6235 4300 4571 4789
Social Learning 
Mean Points 325 586 559 589 309 539 504
Std. dev. Points 238 54 93 62 255 73 47
Deviation from Optimum -215 -68 -69 -66 -220 -66 -49
Total Income 4342 5416 5224 5901 4193 5344 5050
Table II: Regression of log(absolute conditional deviation) (t-statistics in parentheses)   






































*p<.05; ** p<.01 
Table III: Summary statistics comparing immediate and delayed conditions in the beverage 
lifetime 











Total expected losses 
from optimal 



















Note: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below means.   All p-values are one-tailed. 
 
Table IV:  Regression of periods and condition on subject performance  
 Points Beverage 
Sign-preserved 
Log Points 
-2814.36** -39.58* -4.21** Immediate 
condition 
dummy (I) (27292.03) (20.39) (1.43) 
-171.61 -20.78 -2.30 r1 (6264.08) (16.77) (1.20) 
-458.17 -57.27** -3.73** r2 (6264.08) (16.77) (1.20) 
105.10 44.28** 1.14 r4 (6264.08) (16.77) (1.20) 
-656.71 -26.28 -6.93** r5 (6264.08) (16.76) (1.20) 
282.30 215.82** 4.60** constant (5151.29) (15.14) (1.02) 
R2 0.09 0.16 0.22 
N 268 268 268 
*p<.05 (one-tailed)  **p<.01 (one-tailed) 
 
Table V: Two-stage parameter estimates of δ~  and  β~  
Model Standard Sophisticated Naïve 
















average squared deviations per 
period, before deficits, immediate 
subjects,  using mean β~  and δ~ 
0.230 0.189 0.193 
1-tailed cross-subject t-test of parameter < 1: *p<.05 **p<.02 ***p<0.01 
Table VI – Estimated betas of individual subjects in immediate condition 


















i1 1.07 1.11 1.10 1.19 0.074 0.082 0.008
i2 0.83 0.88 0.32 0.86 0.014 0.022 0.008
i3 0.41 0.48 0.79 0.63 0.393 0.364 -0.029
i4 1.05 1.09 0.89 0.69 0.051 0.051 0.000
i5 1.06 1.10 0.54 0.58 0.005 0.001 -0.004
i6 0.51 0.58 0.49 0.73 0.012 0.010 -0.002
i7 0.87 0.92 0.70 0.74 0.004 0.002 -0.002
i8 1.02 1.07 0.70 0.58 0.492 0.467 -0.025
i9 1.04 1.08 0.57 0.71 0.008 0.012 0.004
i10 0.83 0.88 0.67 0.76 0.004 0.004 0.000
i11 1.01 1.05 0.40 0.82 0.017 0.023 0.006
i12 0.12 0.21 0.08 0.44 0.014 0.001 -0.012
i13 0.70 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.027 0.023 -0.004
i14 0.91 0.96 0.73 0.69 0.021 0.013 -0.008
i15 1.10 1.13 0.61 0.70 0.005 0.010 0.004
i16 1.04 1.08 0.67 0.58 0.063 0.045 -0.018
i17 1.04 1.08 0.77 0.86 0.027 0.033 0.006
i18 0.89 0.94 0.82 0.69 0.056 0.042 -0.014
i19 0.99 1.04 0.19 0.61 0.042 0.038 -0.005
i20 0.97 1.01 0.61 0.69 0.002 0.001 -0.001
i21 0.87 0.92 0.65 0.73 0.077 0.074 -0.004
i22 0.99 1.03 0.54 0.79 0.018 0.023 0.004
i23 0.72 0.78 0.71 0.78 0.016 0.014 -0.002
i24 0.94 0.99 0.76 0.66 0.049 0.036 -0.013
i25 0.45 0.52 0.58 0.72 0.064 0.058 -0.006
i26 0.79 0.85 0.51 0.77 0.007 0.011 0.003
Mean 0.85 0.90 0.62 0.72 0.060 0.056 -0.004
Median 0.93 0.97 0.66 0.71 0.020 0.023 -0.002
St Dev 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.13 0.116 0.109 0.010
 



















Optimal Consumption Income Realisations Cash-on-hand
 
Figure II:  Screenshot of Excel interface 
 






































Average Conditional Deviation (Sequence 1)
Average Conditional Deviation (Sequence 7)
Optimal (Horizontal Axis)
Confidence Intervals (Sequence 1)
Confidence Intervals (Sequence 7)
v







































Average Conditional Deviation (Sequence 1)
Average Conditional Deviation (Sequence 7)
Optimal (Horizontal Axis)
Confidence Intervals (Sequence 1)
Confidence Intervals (Sequence 7)  
Figure V:  Ratio of average consumption to conditional optimal by condition, periods 1-10 
Ratio of Average Consumption to Conditional 






















 Figure VI: Actual (y) and conditionally 
optimal (x) utilities, observations between -
50 and +50 (n=14,228) 
Figure VII: Frequency of actual and 
conditionally optimal utilities, observations 
between -10 and +10 (n=14,228) 






























-10.5 -5.5 -0.5 4.5 9.5
Actual Conditional  
Figure VIII: Actual (y) and conditionally 
optimal (x) utilities in study 2, observations 
between -50 and +50 (n=5,840) 
Figure IX: Actual (y) and conditionally 
optimal (x) ml of beverage, observations 
between -25 and +25 (n=1346) 
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